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Introduction, Aims & Methodology 
 
At the broadest level my work explores the multiple and intersecting legal regimes that govern 
families and reproduction from a feminist socio-legal perspective. My publications appear in 
the highest quality scholarly journals, the majority of them international journals. This research 
has made a distinctive and internationally recognised contribution to the development of 
critical scholarship and law reform, broadening legal understandings of family and developing 
new approaches to relationship recognition in law.  
 
My research examining legal regimes is informed by a broad range of sources of knowledge in 
addition to classic legal primary and secondary texts. Although I often draw upon reported case 
law to tease out how contested legal issues appear in formal representations this is rarely a 
purely doctrinal analysis, but rather comprises a contextual examination of how such issues 
came to be under contest and an exploration of the values, possibilities and norms at play. 
There are a number of different threads in my methodology apparent through the included 
works; these are: international comparative analysis; doctrinal analysis; interdisciplinary 
research in particular utilising sociological data; and my own empirical research, all taking place 
within a policy and reform framework that attends to the lived experience of law in order to 
inform legal developments.  
 
My commitment to incorporating the ‘lived lives’ and unmet legal needs of affected 
populations was influenced by foundational Australian feminist legal scholars such as Reg 
Graycar and Jenny Morgan, who argued for the disregard of legal categories in favour of 
centring women’s experiences, which cut across multiple legal arenas and doctrines.1 Thus my 
body of work is not ‘family law’ in the traditional sense as I have never focused upon the 
jurisdiction of family courts dealing with matrimonial causes, property and child related 
disputes on separation. Nor is it ‘health law’ as my work on reproduction is linked instead to 
issues of kinship and family formation and thus places what would be regarded by law as 
distinct moments in medical decision-making or consent within this broader frame across the 
life cycle of reproductive choices and experiences. Yet as part of this work I have necessarily 
developed considerable doctrinal knowledge, with specific expertise on the complex issue of 
legal parentage in the field of assisted reproduction and surrogacy, child-related disputes in 
family law, and the regulation of assisted reproduction. 
 
My commitment to ‘lived lives’ has meant that much of my legal analysis is undertaken through 
an inter-disciplinary lens, influenced by the approach of legally focused but sociologically 
informed feminist scholars such as Susan Boyd, Sally Sheldon and Carol Smart.2 In particular I 
                                                          
1 The Hidden Gender of Law (1990). 
2 Susan Boyd, ‘Gendering Legal Parenthood: Bio-Genetic Ties, Intentionality and Responsibility’ (2007) 25 Windsor 
Yearbook of Access to Justice 55; Sally Sheldon, ‘Reproductive Technologies and the Legal Determination of 
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focus upon social context and draw upon available sociological and psychological research into 
assisted reproduction, genetics and non-traditional families to unpack the values both implicit 
and explicit in law’s responses to litigated controversies involving such families across a variety 
of arenas. In common with these scholars I address these controversies not just from a 
doctrinal perspective (ie what question was asked, and answered, in law, and whether/how 
that answer is in conformity with previous law or comparative law) but from a contextual and 
socially grounded perspective. Instead my work asks: what issues are being raised about 
understandings of motherhood, fatherhood and kinship? what issues are ignored or elided? 
what questions ought to have been asked but were not? Thus I engage in a consideration of 
range of other possibilities and meanings surrounding or undergirding the controversy. As I 
note later one of the questions I return to in this method is the implication of law in creating 
the conditions which produce the dispute in question, that is, how the exclusions or 
discriminatory impacts of law act to provoke or generate such controversies, ie through 
exclusions or limiting the range of choices available to participants.  
 
While never having worked from a libertarian premise my later work develops a feminist 
perspective which values autonomy and ‘resonant choice’ for women in family formation and 
reproductive work practices. This approach has been strongly influenced by the work of Amrita 
Pande, Angela Campbell and Therese Murphy on ‘textured’ or ‘resonant’ choice.3 I argue that a 
feminist approach to choice entails a detailed and grounded understanding which attends to 
women’s experiences and respects their agency, while acknowledging that a wide range of 
structural factors can and do constrain it. I propose that law must retreat from paternalistic, 
universalised and intrusive ‘welfare’ models in assisted reproductive technology (ART) 
regulation to make space for informed choice and autonomy which goes beyond ‘consent’ to a 
particular outcome and involves an active and on-going process of selection or ‘resonant 
choice’.  Within this frame I see a role for the State in enhancing opportunities for the exercise 
of such textured choice through maintaining minimum clinical and ethical standards of care 
and preventing demonstrably unsafe practices. 
 
I have often undertaken comparative analysis drawing from the jurisprudence and scholarship 
of closely related jurisdictions, in particular Australia, the UK and Canada, in order to address 
common thematic issues and to draw them together towards reform proposals and solutions. I 
believe a comparative methodology to be particularly fruitful in this field.  The UK, Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand have looked to each other regularly in developing legislative 
responses to assisted reproductive technologies over the past 30 years. These countries have 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Fatherhood’ (2005) 11 Feminist Legal Studies 349; ‘Evans v Amicus Healthcare, Hadley v Midland Fertility Services: 
Revealing Cracks in the ‘Twin Pillars’?’ (2004) 16 Child and Family Quarterly 437; ‘Only Skin Deep: The Harm of 
Being Born a Different Colour to One’s Parents’ (2011) 19 Medical Law Review 657. 
3 See eg Amrita Pande, ‘Commercial Surrogacy in India: Manufacturing a Prefect Mother-Worker’ (2010) 35(4) 
Signs 969-992; Angela Campbell, Sister Wives, Surrogates and Sex Workers (2013); Therese Murphy, ‘The Texture 
of Choice’ in Therese Murphy (ed), New Technologies and Human Rights (2009) at 214. 
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all faced similar social movements at proximate historical moments (for example gender 
neutral ‘equality’ claims by lesbian and gay couples and parents for inclusion into existing legal 
avenues of family recognition, the rise of father’s rights movements and discourse, an 
increasing emphasis on genetic ‘truth’), but have addressed them within differing overarching 
legal frameworks. Thus for example litigation and advocacy in Canada has been strongly 
framed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, while, despite the influence of the UK 
Human Rights Act, in the UK and Australia family based reforms have been far more 
legislatively focused. Canada and Australia share the challenges of being a federation with 
multiple jurisdictions pulling in different directions, and also the benefit of internal 
comparisons and lessons learned as states/provinces build on or leapfrog over one another in 
their reform processes.  
 
This comparative methodology has allowed me to build on, and enter into, a scholarly 
conversation about the meaning and impact of these developments, in particular addressing 
the tension of reform movements seeking apparently gender neutral ‘equality’ or legal 
‘inclusion’ for non-normative, non-genetic families, at the same time as family law systems 
appear to be on a trans-national trajectory centring the ‘eternal biological family’ as a unit of 
state concern and intervention. My work has always been gendered in that I centre women’s 
experiences and have therefore sought to distinguish the needs of lesbians in the face of 
‘neutral’ but arguably male-centric legal claims for gay and lesbian family based rights by 
equality seekers. In this endeavour I have been strongly influenced and built upon the work of 
Canadian scholars such as Didi Herman, Shelley Gavigan and Susan Boyd and Claire Young who 
have consistently examined women’s position in relation to both productive and reproductive 
labour to centre lesbians and deconstruct ‘gay and lesbian’ equality claims accordingly.4  
 
More broadly my work engages with how gay and lesbian equality claims and those of other 
non-genetic families interact with prevailing ideas of fatherhood and genetics at work in law. 
Although the term was first coined by Selma Sevenhuijsen5, feminist socio-legal scholars in the 
UK such as Carol Smart, Bren Neale and Alison Diduck6, in Australia such as Reg Graycar,7 and in 
the USA Janet Dolgin,8 have argued that the rise of the ‘eternal biological family’ encapsulates 
                                                          
4 See eg Didi Herman, ‘Are We Family?: Lesbian Rights and Women's Liberation’ (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 789; Rights of Passage (1994); Gavigan, "Equal Families, Equal Parents, Equal Spouses, Equal Marriage: The 
Case of the Missing Patriarch” (2006) 33 Supreme Court Law Review 2d series 317; "A Parent(ly) Knot: Can Heather 
Have Two Mommies?" in Didi Herman and Carl Stychin (eds), Legal Inversions: Lesbians, Gay Men and the Politics 
of the Law (1995); Boyd and Young, ‘Losing the Feminist Voice? Debates on the Legal Recognition of Same Sex 
Partnerships in Canada’ (2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 213. 
5 ‘Fatherhood and the Political Theory of Rights: Theoretical Perspectives of Feminism’ (1986) 14 International 
Journal of the Sociology of Law 329. 
6 Smart and Neale, Family Fragments (1999); Alison Diduck, Law’s Families (2004). 
7 Reg Graycar, ‘Law Reform by Frozen Chook: Family Law Reform for the New Millenium?’(2000) 24 Melbourne 
University Law Review 737. 
8 Janet Dolgin, ‘Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation of the Ideology of the Family’ (2000) 
32 Connecticut Law Review 523. 
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developments through the 1990s in which ideas about the significance of genetic parenthood, 
in particular genetic fatherhood, fused with equality discourse, have come to dominate the 
family law landscape. I have been influenced by a number of UK scholars such as Smart, 
Therese Murphy and Ilke Turkmendag’s work on attending to the elision of parents, and most 
particularly women, from child-centred discourses in reproduction and family law in recent 
years.9 
 
In later work, Smart has examined paternity disclosure and welfare or ‘best interests’ 
approaches in law to the ‘truth’ of genetic heritage10 in ways highly relevant to my work in 
assisted reproduction and identity disclosure regimes. In the last two pieces included here I 
have developed my own work on how a right to knowledge about genetic progenitors in law 
has been uncritically translated into a need to know in policy and practice without attending to 
the diverse and contingent range of personal meanings that such information has to those 
affected by it.  
My work is also strongly interdisciplinary. For example the last three papers presented here 
build upon an existing body of international and Australian sociological research regarding 
evolving kinship practices arising from ART, much of which has been developed through 
anthropology.11 In examining the perspective of parents forming families through ART 
concerning legal and ethical rules governing their decisions about the use of frozen embryos, 
utilisation of donated gametes, and access to disclosure regimes, I employ and develop 
‘relational theory’ most prominently articulated by Canadian feminist scholars such as Jocelyn 
Downie12 and Jennifer Nedlesky13 to develop an understanding of access to information as 
informed by needs rather than rights, and as part of a family system of information sharing 
about genetic links that may, or may not, understand such links as ‘relatives’. 
 
I have always been an applied legal scholar in the sense that my research and writing on family 
and reproduction issues has been directed to reforms resolving identified problems and 
addressing unmet legal needs of vulnerable populations. Thus, while my work is theoretically 
informed it is applied to a reform agenda and tested against practical outcomes. The reform 
                                                          
9 Turkmendag, Dingwall and Murphy, ‘The Removal of Donor Anonymity in the UK: The Silencing of Claims by 
Would-Be Parents’ (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 283; Turkmendag, ‘The Donor 
Conceived Persons Right to Personal Identity’ (2012) 39 Journal of Law and Society 58. 
10 ‘Law and the Regulation of Family Secrets’ (2010) 24 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 397. 
11 See eg Marilyn Strathern, Kinship, Law & the Unexpected (2005); C Thompson, Making Parents (2005); Sarah 
Franklin et al, Technologies of Procreation, 2nd ed (1999); Maggie Kirkman, ‘Genetic Connection and Relationships 
in Narratives of Donor-Assisted Conception’ (2004) 2 Australian Journal of Emerging Technologies & Society 1; 
Damien Riggs & B Scholz, ‘The Value and Meaning Attached to Genetic Relatedness Among Australian Sperm 
Donors’ (2011) 30 New Genetics & Society 41.  
12 Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer Llewellyn (eds), Being Relational: Reflections on Relational Theory and Health Law, 
(2011). 
13 Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy and Law (2012). Arguably this approach is also strongly 
present in an applied form in the recent report of Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Donor Conception: Ethical Aspects 
of Information Sharing (2013).  
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models I have developed through the course of this work include the formulation of automatic 
parentage recognition from birth for lesbian led families in assisted conception; the 
development of parentage transfer and citizenship rules for surrogacy families; revised laws, 
guidelines and practices for embryo donation and storage; and a hybrid altruistic/commercial 
model for compensated surrogacy with the assistance of paid intermediaries. The impact of 
this work in the Australian legislative context is significant.14 
 
My ‘presumed parent’ model to accord legal recognition to children in families formed through 
assisted reproduction has been one of my most significant achievements in terms of 
implementing reform. This model was developed initially through my community law reform 
work15 and later deepened and articulated in more detail through comparative law scholarship 
on the notion of functional family. I developed an argument for extending existing parentage 
rules in assisted conception to provide a broadly applicable presumption based approach to 
parenthood from birth for the second parent in lesbian-led families that did not require a 
formal application or court based intervention. At the time this was a highly novel approach as 
legal recognition of lesbian parents in Canada and the US had largely been undertaken through 
formalised second parent adoption processes and in Australia and the UK through the use of 
court orders for more limited forms of parental responsibility. I argued that such court 
processes were an unnecessary barrier to parental status for in-tact functioning lesbian families 
and that from-birth consent based presumptions were more appropriate as well as more 
utilitarian. My ‘presumed parent’ model and its rationale was expressly endorsed by the NSW 
Law Reform Commission and acknowledged in NSW legislative debates;16 and has now been 
introduced into law in every Australian state and federal jurisdiction, the last of which was 
South Australia in 2011. At a federal level I was significantly involved in the raft of Australian 
legislative reforms concerning same-sex and surrogacy families which passed in late 2008. My 
intervention led to the abandonment of the government’s original ‘catch all’ parent category 
and incorporation in federal law of my two key proposals concerning children born through 
assisted reproduction and surrogacy through the new s60HB and s60H(1) of the Family Law Act 
1975 (Cth). My written submissions and oral testimony to the Senate Inquiries, which directly 
drew from my research in ‘The Role of Functional Family’ and ‘The Limits of Functional Family’ 
                                                          
14 Recent law reform reports and inquiries which rely upon the research submitted here include: Family Law 
Council, Parentage Reference (2013); NSW Ministry of Health, Review of the Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 
2007 (NSW) (2013); Tasmanian Parliament, Surrogacy Bill Inquiry (2012); NSW Parliament, Inclusion of Donor 
Details on the Register of Births (2012) and Inquiry into Donor Information (2013); Queensland Parliament, 
Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy (2008); Senate Committee, Inquiry into the Family Law Amendment (De 
Facto Financial Matters and Other Measures) Bill 2008 (2008) (and parliamentary briefing paper); NSW 
Parliament, Legislation on Altruistic Surrogacy (2009).  
15 See Jenni Millbank for the GLRL, And then the Brides Changed Nappies: Lesbian Mothers, Gay Fathers and the 
Legal Recognition of Our Relationships with the Children We Raise, A Community Law Reform Document, Final 
Report May 2003 and ‘The Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Families in Australian Law: Part 2 Children’ (2006) 34 
Federal Law Review 205. 
16 See Miscellaneous Acts Amendment (Same Sex Relationships) Act 2008 (NSW), NSW Legislative Council 
Parliamentary Debates, 3 June 2008; NSW Law Reform Commission, Relationships and the Law, 2006. 
7 
were relied upon in the Bills Digest, Senate Committee Reports and federal parliamentary 
debates.17  
 
More recently I have contributed to policy development and reform of Victorian and NSW laws 
concerning the storage, donation and disposal of human embryos, through the ‘Embryo 
Donation’ paper submitted here, as well as other outputs from the same research project. 
These works argue that the law fundamentally fails to take account of the diversity of ways in 
which stored IVF embryos have meaning for the women and men who created them. Thus 
mandatory time limits on storage, as well as restrictions on modes of disposal, are 
unnecessarily intrusive without any real benefit to IVF patients or broader policy goals. This 
research, in addition to law reform submissions on the same topic drawing upon the published 
work,18 and consultations with regulators, contributed to 2013 amendments to the Assisted 
Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) and 2014 amendments to the Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Regulations 2009 (NSW).19 The reforms allow for longer and more flexible storage 
periods in both jurisdictions, and for the abolition of the distinction between donated and non-
donated gametes in storage rules in NSW. 
 
As noted above throughout my work I have drawn upon the social sciences both in terms of 
theoretical perspectives (in particular anthropological work on assisted reproduction and 
kinship studies) and methods to make use of empirical research into people’s experience of law 
and family. Since the late 2000s this has included designing and conducting my own empirical 
research, in collaboration with colleagues Isabel Karpin and Anita Stuhmcke, into the views and 
experiences of people undertaking IVF, which I draw upon in the latter phase of scholarship 
presented here. To build a picture of the impact of law and policy on the actual choices and 
opportunities of ART users from the ground up, we utilised both qualitative and quantitative 
methods, conducting a series of interviews and surveys across Australian states and territories. 
The data draws on the experiences of past and present ART patients at over 20 different clinical 
sites, spanning more than two decades, covering all jurisdictions in Australia except the 
Northern Territory. Our sole inclusion criterion was that an individual or couple had engaged in 
                                                          
17 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in 
Commonwealth Laws – General Law Reform) Bill 2008, Report (October 2008); Senate Standing Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Matters and Other Measures) Bill 
2008, Report (August 2008); Parliamentary Debates, Senate Hansard Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial 
Matters and Other Measures) Bill 2008, 14 October 2008; Bills Digest no. 9 2008-09 - Family Law Amendment (De 
Facto Financial Matters and Other Measures) Bill 2008. See also Human Rights Commission, Same-Sex: Same 
Entitlements, Report 2007 and Jenni Millbank, Areas of Federal Law that Exclude Same Sex Couples and Families, 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Research Report 2006. 
 
18 Millbank, Stuhmcke, Karpin, Submission to NSW Ministry of Health, Review of the Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Act 2007 (NSW) (2013). We have also made submissions to a review of the federal ethical guidance: 
Millbank, Stuhmcke, Karpin, Submission to NHMRC Review, Ethical Guidelines on Assisted Reproduction (2014). 
 
19 Kirsty Needham, ‘NSW Health Dumps 10-year Limit on Frozen Embryos’ 11 January 2015, Sydney Morning 
Herald.   
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IVF treatment and stored embryos (whether at the time of this study or previously).20 This 
empirical work involved seeking the views of those who were most intimately concerned with 
the subject matter of our inquiry; thus we did not seek the views of the general public or those 
contemplating treatment, but only those who had undertaken IVF and had embryos in storage 
as a result.  
 
In all there were 349 eligible surveys and 51 semi-structured interviews with a total of 54 
interviewees. As legal researchers undertaking this work we examined both the awareness of 
legal rules in decision-making and their impact in framing available choices. For example the 
‘choice’ to donate or destroy embryos in a jurisdiction with a mandatory storage time limit is 
different to a voluntarily elected outcome. Quantitative data collected through the surveys was 
statistically analysed with the aid of SPSS. Qualitative data both in the surveys and interviews 
were subject to thematic discourse analysis.21 Close attention was paid to repeated discursive 
and narrative frames within the text, particularly in relation to how participants described their 
decision-making processes, and mismatches between participant understandings of their rights 
and options and the existing legal frameworks which they were subject to. Identified themes 
and motifs were then subject to comparative analysis, to ensure uniformity of interpretation. 
This engagement in directly conducting empirical work added a richer layer to my long-
standing approach of incorporating data on the lived experience of law to an analysis of a 




The collection of papers that I present here all grapple with the role of law in regulating access 
to family formation avenues for ‘reproductive outsiders’, and provides for various forms of 
recognition of families formed through such means, in particular for the parent-child 
relationship in non-genetic families. 
Scholarship and activism concerning reproduction and parenting over the late 20th and early 
21st centuries has evinced a bifurcated trend. Lesbian and gay family related issues and those 
of heterosexual parents have usually been addressed separately, by different people writing to, 
and speaking with, different audiences. Scholars on reproductive rights are more likely to 
mention cases concerning gay or lesbian parties in passing as evidence of a wider point (such as 
                                                          
20 See Jenni Millbank, Anita Stuhmcke, Isabel Karpin and Eloise Chandler Enhancing Reproductive Opportunity 
Report 2013, Appendix I for detailed demographic data, including a comparison of survey and interview 
respondents. See Appendix II for the survey instrument.  
21 In the sense proposed by Norman Fairclough – as a mode of action or social practice, as well as a mode of 
representation: Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (1992). Each member of the research team 
undertook repeated readings of interview transcripts and survey open responses both throughout the data 
collection period and afterwards. Following data familiarisation, each researcher coded transcripts for emergent 
themes. 
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the role of intention in determining parentage) rather than to centre their concerns and 
experiences within the analysis, or explore to them in any detail. Meanwhile, gay and lesbian 
family-related scholarship traditionally had a far greater focus on family recognition issues 
specific to gay men and lesbians as couples and, more latterly, parents, rather than on issues of 
reproductive rights related to family formation. Perhaps because many gay and lesbian families 
conceive in collaboration with each other in informal circumstances, access to family formation 
avenues has not been felt to be as pressing an issue as the legal recognition of families already 
in existence. Yet, there is a sizable portion of gay and lesbian intending parents who are either 
unable or unwilling to reproduce in concert with each other and so who do need state 
regulated avenues such as fertility services and surrogacy. Both of these avenues have 
historically been, and often continue to be, highly discriminatory against same sex couples. 
While commentators have pointed out the lack of reasoned basis for exclusions, and identified 
avenues for challenging exclusions, scholarly discussion has tended not to extend beyond quite 
formalistic in-or-out, equal-not-equal parameters. Moreover, when challenges have been 
brought, or campaigns waged, for change by gay and lesbian parenting groups or individuals, 
there has been little sense of common cause with heterosexual individuals and couples who 
are also prospective parents and who seek to use these same avenues of family formation. In 
short, gay and lesbian attention has been focused on the exclusion of gay men and lesbians by 
virtue of their sexuality, and has too frequently assumed that heterosexual people are included 
by virtue of their heterosexuality, overlooking the fact that heterosexual prospective parents 
are variably situated and may also suffer harmful and discriminatory forms of exclusion from 
assisted reproduction avenues for a wide range of reasons. My work has sought to traverse this 
gulf, by working simultaneously on both family formation and family recognition issues, and 
through considering ‘reproductive outsiders’ and centring the non-genetic family as a 
reference point, cutting across gay/straight and single/couple family typologies. 
 
In earlier works I argued that legal categories must reflect the lived experience of family. As 
such, formal ‘equality’ claims by non-normative families were meaningless if they addressed 
comparators in a reductive or misleading sameness/difference binary; rather they must be 
grounded in a claim to recognition. The first three papers presented here, all published in 2008, 
were originally conceptualised as one article that grew into three distinct branches. These 
three articles explore the issue of legal recognition of non-genetic parents, particularly co-
mothers in lesbian-led families, utilising ‘functionality’ and ‘intentionality’ as frames through 
which to understand non-genetic parents’ claims to parental status in law. Each paper builds 
upon the last as a related series in a discussion of the potentiality and perils of each frame of 
recognition once translated into legal rules and applied in contested situations such as 
litigation. A key thread to all of my work has been to produce grounded understandings and 
applications of legal theories and policies, and these three pieces do so through examination of 
litigated cases across comparative jurisdictions. 
10 
 
In the first of the papers, ‘The Role of Functional Family’ I trace the development and 
translation of the notion of ‘functional family’ drawn from sociological thought across to 
jurisprudence and law reform models. This piece argues in favour of ‘functional family’ as being 
able to adapt to family diversity, evolve over time and tailor legal definitions to suit particular 
contexts or meet the particular legislative purpose. The sweep of the piece is large, addressing 
Canada, Australia, the UK and USA from the late 1980s through to the date of publication in 
2008. In doing so, the article connects same-sex relationship recognition trends and claims to 
non-normative non-marital relationships more broadly, and to critiques and commentary of 
the developing frameworks of regulation of ‘informal’ and non-marital relationships. The 
descriptive content of case law and legislative developments is used to unearth and connect 
national and trans-national trends in which the ‘lived reality’ of family transformed not just 
particular legal categories but law’s understandings of family relationships and its own role in 
regulating them.  
 
In ‘The Limits of Functional Family’ I temper the optimistic assessment of functional family 
claims to recognition with a deeply critical examination of how a functional family model has 
faltered in the context of both intra-lesbian disputes and lesbian-donor disputes concerning 
children. As with ‘The Role of Functional Family’ the article is grounded in a detailed 
comparative analysis of case law, drawn from the UK, Australia, Canada, the US and also New 
Zealand over a 20 year period. In particular this piece wrestles with the complex inter-
relationship between legal approaches to functionality in the face of resistance by genetic 
parents and questions how gendered notions of being a parent and doing parenting play out in 
this context. I conclude that while functional family should work to resolve intra-lesbian and 
donor versus mother disputes, the case law demonstrates that it has not done so. A detailed 
analysis of the case law revealed that misapplication or misunderstanding of functional family 
claims has seen co-mothers characterised as temporary caregivers, or as capable of providing 
only a fraction of the maternal role provided by biological mothers. In donor versus mother 
disputes courts consistently overlooked family function in order to impose biological fathers as 
parent figures. In this sense I argue that functional parenthood claims have acted to augment, 
but not to challenge and never to displace, the primacy of genetic links in law’s 
conceptualisation of parenthood.  
 
As a result I argue in that piece that a form of presumed second-parent recognition for lesbian 
mothers is necessary to preface and ground, but not entirely replace, the functional family 
model. I note that in the preceding decade much law reform and litigation internationally on 
behalf of lesbian and gay parents proceeded under a formalistic ‘equal treatment’ approach, 
often generated from constitutional arguments in the US, analogising co-mothers with the 
11 
position of male parents in heterosexual families. This context produced very little engagement 
with the underlying principles or discussion of the ‘fit ’ in its application to lesbian-led families. 
The model I proposed built on ideas first proposed by US family law scholars Nancy Polikoff and 
Paula Ettelbrick, centring the issues of family formation, parental roles and unmet legal needs, 
rather than abstract equality claims.22 Here I justify the presumed second parent approach as 
one that most closely embodies (the majority of) mothers’ family formation intentions and 
argue that family function largely flows on from, and embodies, such intentionality. I also go 
further to argue that both intention and family function may require additional, adaptive, 
recognition measures to augment any parenting presumptions in law. This means that there 
need not be always, or only, two legal parents, depending upon the context of the family 
formed through assisted reproductive means. 
 
‘Unlikely Fissures’ builds upon and broadens the questions and conclusions about 
intentionality that are raised in ‘The Limits of Functional Family’, examining resonances 
between the position of lesbian mothers and other contexts in which intention is key to family 
formation for (mostly) heterosexual families, exploring case studies across three areas of 
contestation: birth registration, surrogacy and pre-birth disputes over embryos. The birth 
registration case study23 highlights the uneasy relationship between equality jurisprudence in 
Canada in which lesbian families won the ability to register the non-biological mother on the 
birth register through drawing upon an earlier father’s rights claim, and examines the extent to 
which such equality claims elide significant issues of social context, including caregiving and 
power imbalances. The third case study24 on surrogacy also explores discomfort with the 
‘portability’ and application of abstract legal claims concerning intentionality in family 
formation, noting that groundbreaking birth recognition claims made on behalf of lesbian co-
mothers in the US state of California drew directly from jurisprudence developed in the context 
of disputed surrogacy cases – in which ‘intention’ was about the unchanged intention of the 
commissioning parents versus the changed intention of the ‘surrogate’ or gestational mother. 
Centring intention in surrogacy disputes means prioritising pre-conception intention over post-
birth intention, and privileging the commissioning parents’ intentions over the reproductive 
labour of the gestational mother and I suggest that extending such principles without regard to 
context or to family function is highly problematic.  
 
                                                          
22 See eg Nancy Polikoff, ‘This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of 
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families’ (1990) 78 Georgetown Law Journal 459; Paula 
Ettelbrick, ‘Who is a Parent? The Need to Develop a Lesbian Conscious Family Law’ (1993) 10 New York Law School 
Journal of Human Rights 513. 
23 Rutherford v Ontario (Deputy Registrar General) (2006) 270 DLR (4th) 90. 
24 Elisa B v Superior Court of El Dorado County, 37 Cal 4th 108 (2005). 
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The article continues the argument for an inter-linked understanding of intention and 
functionality and to models of family recognition that are sensitive and adapted to in-tact as 
opposed to in-conflict relationships. I go on to re-examine the contested Australian surrogacy 
case Re Evelyn25 to explore how discourses of genetic essentialism played out, in particular in 
the evolving ‘pro-contact’ family law culture which places great emphasis on the presumed 
‘welfare’ benefit of enduring biological relationships. In that case the commissioning parents 
(of whom the male partner was also a genetic parent) felt that extensive contact with the birth 
mother and her family (with whom the child had never lived) was threatening to them as a 
family unit, whereas the court characterised this as simply maintaining Evelyn’s family 
relationships. These concerns about an absent biological parent undermining their sense of 
family are strongly resonant of lesbian-led families’ disputes with biological fathers. Lesbian 
mothers have at times opposed contact  between sperm donors and children on the basis that 
the donor’s self-concept as a ‘father’ was undermining their family unit, confusing to the child, 
and necessitated unequal treatment of siblings based on genetic links when families were 
formed with different donors. Courts have been overwhelmingly dismissive of such concerns, 
have ‘naturalised’ the role of donors as fathers and have characterised biological fathers as 
inevitably adding to rather than intruding on or undermining lesbian family units. While in 
lesbian mother versus sperm donor cases, fathers’ rights discourses and genetic essentialism 
flow seamlessly into one another to transform the role of biological fathers from gamete 
donors into bedrock social relationships of unquestioned benefit to children, Re Evelyn shows 
that genetic essentialism does not always benefit fathers. Ideas of genetic truth and the 
importance of genetic relationships to children do not stand alone; rather they are played out 
in the midst of other pre-existing conceptions of gender roles and family forms, which will 
sometimes reinforce and other times cut across genetics.  
 
‘Unlikely Fissures’ further explores law’s approach to male genetic links and intentionality in 
family formation through two UK cases about the use of stored embryos in IVF: the first, Re R, 
involving a woman who used an embryo created with donor sperm without the knowledge of 
her former partner (raising the issue of his legal status as a parent)26 and the second, the well-
known case of Evans, involving the desire of a woman to utilise a stored embryo created with 
her former partner’s sperm to attempt pregnancy against his express wishes.27 The cases 
highlight the interplay of intention and genetics in legal rules regulating assisted reproduction 
and parentage such that consent to conception attempts and consent to legal parenthood are 
intertwined in a quest to avoid ‘fatherlessness’. Through unpacking these cases I argue that it is 
possible, and in some instances desirable, to frame rules about the use of gametes and the 
parentage of children that differ, reflecting the fact that adults may have very different 
                                                          
25 Re Evelyn (1998) FLC 92-807. 
26 Re R [2001] 1 FLR 247 ; Re R [2003] 2 All ER 131 (CA); Re R [2005] 2 AC 621 (HL). 
27 Evans v Amicus Healthcare [2003] All ER 903; Evans v Amicus Healthcare [2004] 3 All ER 1025; Evans v United 
Kingdom [2006] 1 FCR 585 (ECtH.R); Evans v United Kingdom [2007] 2 FCR 5 (Grand Chamber). 
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relationships with gametes, embryos and foetuses than with children. Thus if men in IVF 
conception endeavours are deceived about and excluded from the conception attempt they 
could be given the option to opt-in to legal parenthood at a later point; equally if men 
withdraw their consent after the creation of embryos the result could be that they are not a 
parent in law rather than, as is currently the case, granting them an absolute veto over use of 
the embryo. Prioritising women’s interests in accessing treatment over men’s refusal is 
premised on the far greater physical toll faced by women undergoing IVF and their (usually) 
more limited reproductive opportunities. This centring of women’s experience of risk and 
investment sidesteps equality analysis to address instead relative interests and impact, and is 
taken up and further developed in my later work on the regulation of assisted reproduction.  
 
These case studies also highlight another theme that runs through my work; the role of 
discriminatory laws in restricting or driving choices for participants (who for example 
deceptively utilise an embryo or seek to use a stored embryo because there is no other family 
formation option available to them) such that some of the litigated conflicts in this field are in a 
very real sense generated by the legal rules that seek to resolve them. In later work I respond 
to this insight by arguing that regulation of assisted reproduction (for example concerning 
payment for surrogacy in ‘Rethinking “Commercial” Surrogacy’, family limits and identity 
disclosure rules arising in donor conception in ‘Numerical Limits’ and ‘Identity Disclosure’ and 
embryo storage and donation in ‘Embryo Donation’) must be seen as a work-in-progress, 
developing in response to the rapidly evolving social science evidence base and the variable 
and individualised nature of participants’ understandings of family and kinship.  
 
 ‘Unlikely Fissures’ concludes with a call to reproductive outsiders of all kinds to ‘recognise and 
draw on their commonalities, while being respectful too of differences, in order to work for a 
legal regime that can fully accommodate both their parental aspirations and functional parent-
child relationships’. In later work I continue to develop analysis of the complex site of surrogacy 
in particular to examine collaborative reproduction and non-genetic parenthood. For 
heterosexual ‘outsiders’, family formation with the genetic contribution of a third party 
through the use of donor sperm, eggs or embryos, or with the gestational labour of another 
person in the instance of surrogacy involves a loss of autonomy and departure from ‘the 
natural’ analogous to the experience of gay and lesbian reproduction.   
 
There may seem to be much more difference than commonality between the position of 
lesbian and gay families and those of heterosexual people utilising the myriad of forms of 
assisted reproduction or surrogacy. In particular, the prioritization of genetic connection to 
both parents by most heterosexual couples, and/or the framing of their claims by reference to 
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‘normal’ family, or as close a facsimile as they are able to achieve, act to reinforce both genetic 
essentialism and heteronormativity, and thus potentially undermine or devalue claims to non-
genetic family based on caregiving and functionality. Yet these do not occur in straightforward 
ways. In ‘From Alice to Isabella’ I explore how these tropes of genetic essentialism and 
naturalness are both engrained and destabilised in recent public and parliamentary debates 
concerning surrogacy in a wave of law reform across multiple jurisdictions in Australia.  
 
‘From Alice’ interrogates the role of discourse and narrative in shaping the recent wave of 
reforms to surrogacy law and policy around Australia. The paper argues that the themes which 
emerged through the reform dialogues arise from, and contribute to, the reshaping of 
contemporary understandings of surrogacy specifically and of non-traditional family formation 
more broadly. Prominent discursive themes in both parliamentary and media accounts 
included: surrogacy as a ‘cure’ for infertility; surrogacy as a form of special relationship 
between family and friends; and, genetics as determinative of the ‘real’ or ‘biological’ parents 
of children. Undergirding these debates is the paradoxical and shifting relation of surrogacy to 
the ‘natural’ in terms of reproduction methods, parenting practices and parental desire.  
 
Notably absent from the Australian parliamentary debates was the developing body of 
empirical research on surrogates and surrogacy families. All of the legislative debates took 
place following, or in conjunction with, short term public inquiries and notably heard from only 
a handful of people who had actually gone through surrogacy. At the same time, several dozen 
Australian individuals and couples who had either engaged in surrogacy to form their family, or 
planned to do so in the future, participated in print and electronic media stories about 
surrogacy. I argue that these media representations demonstrably motivated and informed 
legislative reforms, although not always in a straightforward manner. As such, ‘From Alice’ is an 
analysis both of evolving discourses of surrogacy, infertility and ART in Australia, and a case 
study of a multiple jurisdiction law reform process dominated by narrative, anecdote and ‘folk’ 
understandings. 
 
An original finding of this research was the conclusion that an emphasis on maternality and a 
female-centred focus on the birth-surrogate mother dyad produced an unexpectedly malleable 
approach to genetic relatedness, encompassing both more and less than a dual genetic link to 
both parents. A number of Australian states considered, and most rejected, provisions 
restricting surrogacy to gestational arrangements (ie those where the birth mother does not 
use her own egg) and/or requirements that one or both commissioning parents contribute 
gametes. In doing so, parliamentarians relied upon idealised and arguably folkloric notions of 
genetic surrogacy between sisters (in which a direct genetic link with the birth mother provided 
the child with an indirect genetic link to the commissioning mother). This elastic notion of 
genetic connection, encompassing non-linear genetic links and broader ideas of ‘relatedness’ 
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within discourses of surrogacy acted to undercut dominant discourses of genetic determinism 
and combined with evolving notions of family diversity to allow less restrictive legislation to 
eventually pass in the majority of Australian jurisdictions.  
 
 
The most marked difference found in the two sites of reform dialogue was that while 
parliamentary debates uncritically perpetuated the stark dichotomisation of ‘altruistic’ and 
‘commercial’ surrogacy which has been a notable feature of Australian laws and policy to date, 
in contrast, many of the families who participated in media stories had engaged in commercial 
surrogacy overseas and spoke positively of the benefits of payment. In my analysis, the press 
reports revealed a surprisingly nuanced approach to payment, which included some aspects of 
authorial tone that retained condemnation (‘womb for rent’) but also explored the role of 
payment in particular situations and allowed for a wider range of meanings around the roles in 
commercial surrogacy. This ‘unpacking’ of payment appears to me to be a new development in 
Australian public discourses on surrogacy. 
 
I take up the question of payment in surrogacy directly in ‘Rethinking “Commercial” 
Surrogacy’. Current Australian laws criminalising commercial surrogacy treat the payment of 
money to surrogates and/or intermediaries as a crude and absolute proxy for all forms of bad 
practice. Noting the marked absence of social science research in the reform dialogues 
discussed in ‘From Alice’ I address the social science evidence base from the US, UK and Israel 
to contend that payment alone cannot be used to differentiate ‘good’ surrogacy arrangements 
from ‘bad’ ones. I suggest that the recoil of Australian policy makers from any suggestion of 
commercialisation of reproduction has blinded us to the complexities and resulted in a head-in-
the-sand approach to the increasingly transnational practice of commercial surrogacy. I seek to 
open this debate by contending that Australia can learn from commercial surrogacy practices 
elsewhere, without replicating them.  
 
I make a case for financial compensation of women who perform surrogacy and the 
introduction of specialist surrogacy agencies or ‘brokers’ (encompassing a range of professional 
intermediaries who co-ordinate and perform screening, matching, counselling and associated 
support services) and mechanisms such as advertising within Australia. I do so not because I 
support unregulated fertility markets or am indifferent to the interests of children and 
vulnerabilities of adult parties engaged in surrogacy. Rather the reverse. The challenge of 
liberalising access to domestic surrogacy is informed by an awareness of the increased practice 
of cross border surrogacy and concern over the vast schism that has opened between, on the 
one hand, increasingly stringent clinical and ethical standards in operation in domestic 
regulated treatment, and on the other, highly variable clinical and ethical practices which take 
place abroad. For example the transfer of multiple embryos is common in international 
surrogacy arrangements because it increases the likelihood of a pregnancy, and in doing so it 
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hastens the process and boosts ‘success’ rates of clinics and agencies, while producing 
dangerously high multiple birth rates with adverse health effects such as premature and 
underweight births.28 While not all cross border treatment should be characterised as sub-
standard, its use does give rise to an increased risk of exposing offspring to inheritable and 
birth disorders and reduces or negates access to beneficial ethical practices such as the 
possibility of future information sharing and identity disclosure. My later work develops a 
deeper understanding how legal regulation could respond to avoidance and evasion by 
becoming more facilitative in order to induce participation in formal regimes. 
 
The principal ethical precondition for surrogacy in my view is informed and continuing consent 
of the surrogate. Textured or authentic choice requires a background of life conditions which do 
not constrain her options to the point that surrogacy is pursued for money when it would 
otherwise be an unacceptable practice to her. In the context of surrogacy laws, informed and 
continuing consent requires that the surrogate has full control of pregnancy care and 
relinquishment of the baby post-birth, with consensual transfer of parentage after birth. I 
contend in this article that these elements are not incompatible with compensated surrogacy 
or the involvement of intermediaries. Indeed, high quality and truly independent professional 




My later work explores more deeply and in greater detail the distinct tension between, on the 
one hand, a growing visibility of a wide variety of non-genetic family forms, and on the other, 
increasing emphasis on genetic identity in public discourse and in social and legal policy. The 
rise of ‘genetic essentialism’ - the idea that genes are constitutive of self and family either to 
the exclusion of or as a trump over social relationships - has occurred through a process by 
which increasingly perfectible access to genetic information has translated into the right and 
need for us all to know the ‘truth’ of our genetic origins. In turn access to this genetic ‘truth’ (or 
history or roots) is laden with cultural values of identity-formation and self-understanding such 
that this genetic knowledge is understood to be essential for ‘completeness’ as an individual.  
 
                                                          
28 Furthermore, regulated ethical approaches to reproductive donation in the domestic context require careful 
and continually refined approaches to consent and counselling processes in licensed ART treatment and, as part of 
that process, require every donor’s advance commitment to identity disclosure in the future should offspring wish 
to access this information. In contrast, the time and cost pressuresof transnational arrangements mean that both 
donors and parents are fast-tracked through processes that may not appropriately address the psycho-social 
dimensions of treatment or potential offspring needs. Australian parents who have subsequently sought to 
identify or make contact with egg donors and surrogates from the country of treatment have often found this 
difficult or impossible to achieve. 
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In family and reproductive policy, a right to knowledge has gradually been transformed from 
the mere identification of progenitors to an increasingly unquestioned assumption that 
identification of genetically related individuals inexorably results in contact with them, leading 
to an ongoing social relationship between once lost and now reunited ‘relatives’. By way of 
example, when the Australian state of New South Wales (NSW) passed the Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Act in 2007, introducing a compulsory centralised donor register for 
the first time, it also reduced the number of families who could be born to each donor and 
introduced for the first time a right for donors to direct their donation away from, certain 
‘classes of women’. This provision was justified by the government on the basis that when the 
child and their ‘genetic parent’ meet, it is, 
in the best interests of the child for the genetic parent to have given consent to the circumstances 
surrounding the child's birth and upbringing. 
 
To put this in another way, it will not be in the child's best interests to discover later in life that their 
genetic parent has a fundamental objection to their existence or the social and cultural circumstances in 
which they were raised. 
Thus in this scenario gamete donors (who become here ‘genetic parents’) must be able to 
relate not just to the child but be able to connect with and approve of the child’s ‘social and 
cultural circumstances’ (elsewhere known as, but not here named as, their ‘family’). 
 
Moreover, the expectation of family reunification with donors implies that the absence of such 
connection will be experienced by off-spring as a loss or lack. In this trope, intact functioning 
genetically unrelated families of mutual care and support are, and always will be, incomplete. 
Importantly, Alison Diduck identifies how genetic relationships are collapsed into the discourse 
of child welfare such that biological relationships are granted ‘priority, in the name of welfare, 
over social ones’ (Diduck 2007 emphasis in original). Thus, children’s welfare or best interests 
are not regarded as separate or additional considerations to those of genetic relatedness; 
rather they are inseverable and mutually reinforcing, as the above example illustrates. In the 
last three of the articles presented here I contest these ideas in the context of empirical work 
on donor embryo recipients and sperm donation recipients drawn from a larger study 
concerning IVF decision making. My aim in these papers is to unpick the threads of knowledge, 
kinship and genetic links through exploring participants’ diverse and evolving understandings of 
their relationships. In doing so I argue for ways that law can provide avenues to respect and 
acknowledge these understandings, without imposing or assuming particular family 
relationships as a consequence of genetic links. 
 
Research into embryo donation has been dominated by the question of donation for research 
purposes (particularly stem cell use), with comparatively little attention to the issue of 
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reproductive use. ‘Embryo Donation for Reproductive Use in Australia’ reports on original 
empirical research with colleagues Isabel Karpin and Anita Stuhmcke into decision-making 
concerning stored embryos utilising both surveys and interviews of IVF participants. This is the 
only co-authored paper presented here, and I claim 40% of the contribution to that piece. The 
following two papers are sole authored but draw upon the same empirical research project and 
owe a deep intellectual debt to our collaboration and shared thinking, talking and arguing 
about the issues over the four years of the project. 
The research from ‘Embryo Donation for Reproductive Use’ made a major contribution to 
understandings of stored human embryos − not as enSSes of singular moral signiﬁcance in 
themselves but rather as relational entities of unique meaning and value to the woman who 
underwent treatment to create them (and her partner). This insight offers the ability to 
sidestep dichotomised views of embryos either as precious ‘life’ or mere ‘cells’ and allows us to 
develop legal regimes which respond more sensitively and flexibly to the range of individual 
meanings and experiences of IVF patients across a myriad of legal and ethical rules that govern 
the use, donation and disposition of stored embryos. 
 
The ‘Embryo Donation’ article specifically addresses notions of relatedness as they arise in the 
context of donation for the reproductive use of others. The reluctance of IVF participants to 
donate has been reported elsewhere, and those findings were largely confirmed by the 
majority of non-donors in our own study. We reflect on the rationales against donation and 
challenge the orthodox position taken in some of the literature that embryo donation is akin to 
adoption, instead unpacking the threads of attachment and relatedness to find that they 
encompassed varied notions of possessiveness, responsibility, unknowability and guilt. The 
major significance and originality of the piece is in its reporting on interviews with ten people 
who had actually donated embryos for the reproductive use of others and four people who 
were recipients of donated embryos. In addition, another nine interviewees had attempted to 
donate, or had a strong desire to donate, but had been prevented from doing so. Although the 
number of interviewees under discussion is small, and we acknowledge that caution must be 
exercised over drawing general conclusions, this pool of participants, including as it does both 
donors and recipients, is among the largest cohort of interviews in any of the extremely scarce 
Australian research to date on the experience of embryo donation for reproductive use, and 
has the added strength of addressing donation practices across numerous clinical sites under 
legal frameworks in different states.  
 
The article examines why the donors interviewed were willing and able to donate, and presents 
findings concerning the donation process and models in operation, including matching and 
counselling practices and the contentious question of ‘directed donation’. The article also 
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examines the experiences of the ‘would-be’ or thwarted donors and queries the rationales for 
some of the external barriers to donation in law, ethical guidance and clinical practice 
identified in the course of the study. As with my other non-empirical works presented here, the 
analysis reaches beyond ‘law on the books’ to ask instead how law appears in the lived 
experience of those most affected by it. 
 
We found among both donors and non-donors a strong sense of the lateral relationship 
between future genetic siblings as one of significance, arguably prioritised by many as more 
significant than the lineal descendant link with either or both parents. This original finding was 
taken up in ‘Identity Disclosure’ through exploration of both the sociological literature and data 
derived from formal donor identity registers. I suggest that while registers are premised on 
offspring seeking the identity of donors, the interest of donor families may lie much more in 
seeking out other offspring, and that registers are largely ill equipped to address this interest, 
most particularly when initiated by parents. These last three papers all focus upon the views 
expressed by parents and prospective parents in the research study, and the latter two on the 
experiences and views of the parents of donor conceived children. In part as a result of peer 
reviewer criticism of these papers as ‘parent-centric’ I engage with child’s rights and best 
interests discourse and the way that they have appeared in ART policy and debates as 
‘competing’ with the interests of parents and donors. I see rights talk as both hollow and facile 
in this context and as such seek to avoid the framework of ‘competing rights’ and oppositional 
placement of (potential) parents and (potential) children’s interests in assisted reproduction 
policy development. This research work most clearly articulated my relational premise: that the 
interests of parents and children are intertwined and that ART policy should be understood as 
part of this relational matrix. Parents are the people most directly invested, and specifically 
concerned with gauging and acting upon, both existing and potential future children’s 
anticipated needs in the lived context of their family life. This is not to suggest that offspring 
views and interests are unimportant; rather, that children’s rights or best interests are neither 
singular nor self-evident and indeed have been interpreted and applied by adults and 
regulators in highly divergent and contradictory ways in recent decades.  
The ‘Numerical Limits’ article critically examines the setting of limits on the number of children 
or family groups that may be formed with a single donor in assisted conception regimes. 
Originally, under conditions of anonymity, numerical limits were said to contain the risk of 
inadvertent consanguinity between offspring who would not know, and could not know, that 
they were genetic half siblings, and also between donor and offspring. The increasing embrace 
of identity disclosure regimes has led to calls for stricter numerical limits based on the 
assumption of connection to ‘too many’ genetic relatives in the future. This article challenges 
the developing orthodoxy that donor conceived individuals must be protected by law from 
having ‘too many’ genetic links and asks: how many is too many? And how do we know? The 
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UK and Australian positions are examined, and placed alongside a discussion of qualitative 
research involving interviews with 20 parents of donor conceived children. The paper examines 
overarching policy rationales for numerical limits before reflecting on how the experiences of 
interviewees in the study refract, contradict and complicate such rationales in the hope of 
informing further reforms with a more nuanced account of relatedness. 
 
The article is original in seeking to openly address the relationship between numerical limits 
and identity disclosure regimes, exposing the underlying ‘common sense’ assumptions and lack 
of evidence base informing policy development in the field. I explore the limited information 
available on what family numbers, and sibling numbers, have actually resulted under previous 
limits, as well as the likelihood of contact being sought and made in the future in the context of 
open disclosure.  Social and cultural perspectives on genetic links, as well as actual experience 
of such relationships, must be carefully unpacked in order to determine what number is likely 
to be ‘burdensome’. I found that there were several factors which contributed to participants’ 
sense of ‘many’ or ‘few’ genetic relatives. In particular, whether parents were mostly 
concerned about avoiding inadvertent contact or with making deliberate contact with the 
donor or half siblings influenced their sense of what the number meant. In tandem with these 
concerns was a varied experience of nearness (commonly expressed as ‘it’s a small town’) 
involving consideration of geographic spread as well as cultural dimensions of proximity such 
as the concentration of particular community groups. This empirical finding has fed into my 
developing analysis of the multiple and contingent meanings of relatedness and how these can 
be mapped into legal regimes that govern family relationships, including but not limited to, 
identity disclosure regimes. 
 
An important finding of the research was that the women interviewed valued genetic links 
between their children and were strongly motivated to use the same donor for later 
pregnancies. Although women in lesbian relationships and single mothers had elected to create 
a family unit in which their child is not raised by two genetic parents, this did not mean that 
they did not value genetic links, in particular between siblings. Indeed the reverse was arguably 
the case as a number of women expressed the significance of a ‘full’ or ‘100%’ genetic link 
between siblings as more important because it simplified already ‘complex’ relationship 
constellations. This link was not necessarily seen as inherent but rather a function of the value 
placed by others on genetics. The socially valued aspects of such links appeared significant. As 
parents contemplated their children seeking out a donor later in life, several stated that it was 
a major factor in their preference for the same donor, because they wanted their children to 
be able to share in that experience, to support each other, and to be similarly situated. In 
particular, a number of women volunteered that they would be worried if one child could find 
their donor and the other child was not able to do so.  
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Yet changes in the legislative definitions used in setting the limit in two Australian jurisdictions 
(from ‘families’ to ‘women’) impacted adversely upon lesbian-led families as they were 
characterised as exceeding the limit if the second ‘woman’ in the couple sought to utilise 
stored sperm or embryos previously used by the other woman. For these families the only 
option left to have another child with the second woman was to move on to use an additional 
donor unrelated to their first child. Thus a smaller number of ‘women’ per donor perversely 
translates into a larger number of donors per family. Law’s role in this scenario is arguably to 
undervalue genetic connectedness within the family unit because of its singular focus on 
policing the number of genetic links taking place outside of it. This case study suggests that 
legal regulation has been both paternalistic and intrusive and highlights the importance of law 
attending to individualised experiences of relatedness rather than to universalised 
understandings.  
 
While I contest the vein of genetic determinism which blurs information and family 
relationships in some of the policy and scholarly debate, my view is that ‘open disclosure’ (ie of 
the fact of donor conception and access to the donor’s identity) is a vital pre-requisite to 
enable donor conceived people to make their own choices about accessing information and to 
form their own meanings and connections regarding genetic links. ‘Identity Disclosure’ 
explores the scope and effectiveness of formal donor identity registers currently in operation in 
assisted conception regimes in Australia and the UK. As with my earlier research in these last 
three articles I undertake comparative legal analysis and engage with the findings of 
sociological findings, but in addition this is augmented with original empirical research, to 
reflect on the experiences of those affected by existing legal regimes and to develop responsive 
reform proposals. 
 
The article examines the function of voluntary registers which are intended to fill the gaps left 
by ‘central’ identity registers that mandate timed release of donor identity on request of donor 
conceived adults. Like ‘Numerical Limits’ this article reflects on interviews with a set of parents 
who had undertaken donor conception in Australia through licensed IVF treatment specifically 
addressing their understandings of disclosure regimes and wishes for, and experience of, 
seeking information and contact.  
 
Although in the UK there was centralised record keeping by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (‘HFEA’) concerning assisted reproduction from 1991, the information 
kept on donors was quite limited, and only expanded and made consistent through new 
regulations in 2004. Identity disclosure donors were required from 2005, with mandatory and 
voluntary registers established at the same time. In contrast to the UK, Australia offers a 
patchwork of varied regimes across states and eras. Three Australian states have government 
held or ‘central’ registers, while individual clinics in the remainder still hold donor identity 
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records and facilitate the process of information exchange and identification (as do clinics in 
legislated states, concerning records preceding the introduction of registers) in a process that is 
regulated through national ethics guidance. There is divergence in law and practice throughout 
Australia regarding issues such as the age at which identifying information may be sought; the 
era of treatment covered; access to donor identity while offspring are still minors; access to 
information identifying half-siblings and access to non-identifying information.  
 
This research found that the current formal voluntary registers in the UK and Australia have 
been dramatically underutilised, with low rates of registration and few matches made. While 
the development of identity registers in Australia and the UK have been at the forefront of 
developments in this field, I argue that they have been premised upon the linear descendant 
genetic link as vital information to be prospectively released to young adults upon the 
attainment of majority. These registers leave a number of gaps: most notably requests for 
access to information from the era of anonymity; access to information prior to the age of 
majority and access to information on other offspring (at majority) or recipient families (for 
parents of minors). The significance of these lateral links has been largely overlooked by legal 
regimes, despite burgeoning sociological research on these links, a development that was 
reflected in the present study. Likewise the role that parents play in shaping, seeking and 
facilitating such lateral relationships either in making contact as family groups, or in seeking 
information on behalf of their children, is overlooked by disclosure regimes premised upon the 
donor-offspring dyad. I suggest that the high rate of participation of parents where they are 
permitted access to voluntary registers indicates such registers would be more effective if they 
were broadened in scope.   
 
 
The article concludes that identity disclosure rules in current assisted conception regimes 
appear to operate in ways that paradoxically act to both create and deny opportunities for the 
development of broader non-traditional kinship networks. Regulators increasingly mandate 
collection and timed release of records of donor identity, compel provision of counselling to 
gamete recipients about the importance of openness with children about the fact of donor 
conception, and even impose disclosure (for example through specifically marked birth records 
in the Australian state of Victoria). Yet at the same time that normative messages are 
communicated by the State and by fertility practitioners about the (potential) importance of 
genetic information in the formation of future children’s self-identity, these same agencies in 
some instances refuse to facilitate communication between parties who have internalised such 
messages and, wishing to act upon them through early disclosure and discussion with their 
children, request varied forms of direct and indirect contact or other forms of non-identifying 
information about donors and offspring. Flat statutory disclosure regimes provide for particular 
kinds of information at set times to prescribed individuals, with little or no ability to adapt to 
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more diverse requests. They also, arguably, fail to acknowledge the important role that parents 
play as custodians of information and of their children’s current and future interests.  
 
Formal voluntary registers offer the hope of contact and information sharing, but very little 
prospect of its realisation and, as such, could be seen to contribute to an institutionalised 
‘limbo’ that some donor conceived people, and donors, experience from assisted conception 
regimes. The article applies these insights to argue for reforms, in particular the development 
of an ‘active’ voluntary register capable of operating both prospectively and retrospectively, 
making contact with possible participants and offering intermediary services to establish and 
communicate expectations and to offer mediated contact, including contact without identity 
disclosure. I contend that this is a better solution than the current polarisation between an 
inability to access information for many on the one hand, or proposed alternatives such as 






The significance and originality of my work lies in its focus upon law’s response to non-genetic 
families. I have always centred the experience of family formation and family life such that I 
have traversed and linked distinct legal sites and doctrines, examining access to family 
formation avenues, models for legal recognition of families once formed and, latterly, legal 
responses to information sharing and broader kinship practices among genetically related 
individuals in childhood and later life.  
 
In doing so I have made a major contribution to a body of scholarship centring ‘lived lives’ in 
the exploration of family, relationship and reproduction law at its broadest, incorporating 
comparative analysis across closely related jurisdictions, attention to and integration of 
sociological data, and a focus on responsive practical reform outcomes.  
 
As an important part of my focus upon lived lives I have brought a continual awareness of 
gender to the unpacking of ‘gay and lesbian’ equality claims and reform movements to analyse 
the differential position of women and men in relation to parenting and paid labour, and 
latterly to build a framework of analysis that bridges heterosexual/same-sex family formation 
issues (papers 1, 2, 3) to examine links and resonances across ‘reproductive outsiders’ or non-
genetic family forms (papers 3, 4). The sweep and reach of this approach makes an original 
contribution by stepping out of doctrinal and jurisdictional silos to examine the impact of law 
upon, and the unmet legal needs of, non-genetic families through the life cycle. 
 
Throughout these works I have contributed to analysis and debate about the role of ‘the 
eternal biological family’ in law, specifically engaging in the inter-relation of developing social 
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notions of genetic essentialism, father’s rights and recognition of non-genetic family forms, in 
legal regimes governing family relationships. I have been one of the leading thinkers in the area 
of ‘functional family’ developing a clear articulation of how these ideas, drawn from 
psychology and sociology were mapped across into legal regimes recognising informal 
relationships (paper 1), examining the limitations of ‘functionality’ when in conflict with genetic 
parenthood (paper 2) and going on to build a framework for understandings of legal 
parenthood in non-genetic families as involving a dynamic interaction of intentionality and 
functionality (paper 2 and 3).  
 
In my work on ART and surrogacy I have built upon a body of feminist work on relational 
theory, agency and resonant choice. I have applied this approach to argue for the centring of 
an understanding of the interests and needs of parties in ART as part of a web of relationships 
rather than as isolated and oppositional rights (papers 6, 7, 8). In particular I have made 
original contributions to understandings of the human embryo in law not as an entity worthy of 
recognition in its own right, but as an object of unique value to the woman who created it, 
including on occasion as an imagined relation (paper 6); in directing attention to lateral rather 
than simply linear genetic links in ART law and policy (paper 6, 7, 8); in looking at how the 
views of parents shape and interact with those of offspring in seeking information on genetic 
relatives (paper 8) and in understandings of the significance of the numbers of potential 
genetic relatives (paper 7). In this area I have made important contributions to unpacking 
policy rationales and examining the largely ignored evidence base concerning family numbers 
and identity disclosure regimes (papers 7, 8) and concerning the experiences of surrogates in 
the development of laws governing surrogacy parentage and payment (papers 4, 5).  
 
I have argued for a nuanced and attentive notion of relatedness in law, incorporating the 
diverse and changeable understandings of the significance of genetic links (traversing a wide 
range of meanings from information source to family member) that individuals in non-genetic 
families formed through ART have expressed (papers 4, 5, 6,7, 8). 
 
Taken together, this is a body of feminist socio-legal work on the regulation of family 
relationships, assisted reproduction, genetics, kinship in law. Through this work I have made an 
original contribution to both scholarly thinking and legislative and policy frameworks 
responding to the needs of non-genetic family forms. 
 
